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Abstract
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I
show how the existence of a fringe of managerial rms a¤ects the stability
of a cartel of strict prot-maximizing rms. There always exists a critical
dimension of the fringe that makes the cartel unstable, and this dimension is
non-monotone in the total number of rms. By appropriately selecting the
dimension of the fringe, a policy maker can a¤ect the equilibrium outcome.
As an example, I consider the case of a domestic authority that is contem-
plating whether to allow entry of a fringe of managerial foreign rms in the
domestic market to increase the competitive pressure, thereby enhancing
domestic welfare.
JEL Classication: D43; L13; L21.
Keywords: Delegation, Cournot oligopoly, Cartel stability, Fringe.
1 Introduction
The issue of cartel stability has a long tradition. Several contributions have
studied the factors and conditions a¤ecting rmsability to implement col-
lusive practices over time, investigating, for example, the consequences of
heterogeneity among agents ( see, inter alia, dAspremont et al. (1983), Don-
simoni (1985), Donsimoni et al. (1986)), the role of imperfect information
(Green and Porter (1984), Rothschild (1999)) and of product di¤erentia-
tion (Ross (1992), Deneckere (1983)), the e¤ect of the imposition of import
quotas (Rotemberg and Saloner, (1986)) or the consequences that fringes of
non-colluding rms have on cartel stability (Sha¤er (1995)).
The standard theoretical framework assumes prot-maximizing rms
whose strategic variables are quantities and prices. Lambertini and Trom-
betta (2002) show that the stability of a cartel is also a¤ected by strategic
delegation. In a Cournot oligopoly, strategic delegation implies that owners
delegate output decisions to managers whose objective functions di¤er from
the owners. When managerial incentives are a mix of prots and sales,
managers behave aggressively and expand their output beyond the familiar
Cournot Nash equilibrium. In the one-shot non-cooperative game, hiring
managers is a dominant strategy in that delegation makes the rm more ag-
gressive under Cournot competition and creates a credible commitment to-
wards output expansion. In equilibrium output is larger and prices are lower
as compared to the Cournot Nash equilibrium, thereby reducing prots and
increasing consumer surplus (Fershtman, 1985, Vickers, 1985). Considering
a repeated Cournot oligopoly between two rms, Lambertini and Trombetta
(2002) show that delegation can make the cartel more unstable when owners
collude in setting the incentives schemes, because it makes deviation from
the cartel more appealing compared to a situation where rms are strict
prot-seeking agents.
In the literature on cartel stability, much attention has been devoted to
the stability of cartels of rms when there exists a competitive fringe (inter
alia, dAspremont et al. (1983), Donsimoni et al. (1985), Donsimoni et
al. (1986), Thoron (1998)). Yet, if the number of rms in the industry is
relatively small, the fringe rms do not necessarily behave as price-takers.
Konishi and Lin (1999) and Sha¤er (1995) consider an oligopoly where fringe
rms make output decisions after the cartel has chosen its output level. In
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this paper, I adopt the same model as Vickers (1985) and Lambertini and
Trombetta (2002), in which all output choices are taken simultaneously,
and I extend the idea that delegation is a relevant strategic variable for
cartel stability by considering how a cartel between owners of pure prot-
seeking rms that maximize joint prots is a¤ected by a fringe of managerial
rms. I show that it is always possible to make the cartel between owners
unstable by appropriately selecting the dimension of the fringe, and that
such a dimension is non-monotone in the total number of rms operating in
the market.
I apply this set up to a situation where a domestic planner cares about
consumer surplus and the prots of the domestic rms operating in the mar-
ket. The planner must choose how many foreign managerial rms (which
will constitute the fringe) she should allow to enter the domestic market
through the acquisition of domestic rms. From the perspective of the do-
mestic planner, I show that it is never optimal to allow the entry of foreign
managerial rms when the market is very concentrated because the increase
in output brought about by entry is not su¢ ciently counterbalanced by the
reduction in prots accruing to the domestic rms. When the market is
more fragmented and the incumbents are patient enough, it may be optimal
to allow managerial rms to get in, as the competitive pressure exerted by
entrants makes the cartel between domestic owners unstable, with the result
that, after entry, all rms delegate and domestic welfare increases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model. In Section 3, I study the optimal output choices made
by managers once the incentive schemes are chosen by the owners of the
rms. Depending on whether the domestic planner has allowed any entry
and depending on the type of equilibrium outcome, four di¤erent cases can
be distinguished. In Section 4, I separately study the four outcomes and
determine the incentive schemes, the optimal output levels and the prots
accruing to the domestic and foreign rms. In Section 5, I determine the
optimal number of managerial rms that should be allowed in the market
in case of entry. In Section 6, I compare the levels of domestic welfare as-
sociated to the four equilibria, and I determine the conditions that bring a
domestic planner to choose whether and how many foreign rms should be
let in the domestic market. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Set up
In an oligopolistic market, n rms compete in quantities for a homogeneous
good whose inverse demand function is
p = a Q (1)
where Q is total output and a is the reservation price. Under the assumption
that production takes place at constant returns to scale, the prot function
of each rm is the following:
 = (p  c)q (2)
where q is the output produced by the rm and c is the unit production
cost, with a > c  0:
The delegation game proposed by Vickers (1985) introduces for a rms
owner the option to delegate control of output decisions to a manager whose
objective is
max
q
M =  + q; (3)
where parameter  is a measure of the relevance of sales and is chosen by
the owner of the rm to maximize prots. The incentive function in (3)
is equivalent to assume that managers maximize a linear combination of
prots and revenues, prots and costs, or sales and costs (dAspremont and
Gerard-Varet (1980), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Katz
(1986), Sklivas (1987)). The special case  = 0 implies that the manager
maximizes the same objective function as the owner would, and that there
is no di¤erence in the output levels produced by an entrepreneurial rm and
a managerial one. In other words,  = 0 is equivalent to say that the owner
hires no manager. In the remainder, I adopt the following:
Assumption 1.  is non-negative.
In the non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium of the delegation
game the non-negativity assumption on  turns out to be non-binding (Vick-
ers, 1985). Yet, when owners collude between them to maximize joint prots,
the optimal amount of delegation is negative (Lambertini and Trombetta,
2002). Clearly, this is a conceivable outcome, but the empirical evidence
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points in the opposite direction, suggesting that managers do not place a
negative weight on sales (Murphy, 1995, Baker et al., 1988).
Consider now the case in which m rms, which constitute the fringe of
managerial rms, are allowed to enter the oligopolistic market according to
the following:
Assumption 2. The number of rms in the market is constant over
time.
This amounts to assume that no mergers are allowed for and that fringe
rms can enter the market only through acquisition of m 2 [0; n] entre-
preneurial incumbents. In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to the
entrants as the foreign rmsand to the incumbents as the domestic rms.
When m = 0; no foreign rm enters the market. Fringe rms are identical
to the incumbents: owners are prot-maximizers and managers maximize
a mix of prots and sales. The only di¤erence is in the set of delegation
options, as foreign rms are always managerial, while the incumbents have
the option to be either managerial or strict prot-seekers.
The number of foreign entrants is regulated by a domestic social planner
whose domestic social welfare function is given by the sum of the prots
accruing to the domestic rms and consumer surplus:
NSW (m) = (n m)i + CS; (4)
where i is the individual prot of a domestic rm (i stands for incumbent)
and CS is consumer surplus. The domestic planner chooses the dimension
m of the fringe, taking into account the following game with complete and
symmetric information:
Stage 1: The domestic planner allows m foreign managerial rms to
buy m domestic rms.
Stage 2: Firmsowners simultaneously choose the incentive scheme of
their manager.
Stage 3: Firms managers simultaneously choose the output level.
When owners are simultaneously choosing whether to delegate or not,
delegation is the dominant strategy of the one-shot noncooperative game
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(see, inter alia, Vickers (1985), Basu (1987), Fershtman and Judd (1987),
Sklivas (1987), Fershtman (1985), Katz (1986)). As this game is repeated
innitely many times, there is scope for stable forms of collusion. In this
paper I focus on collusion occurring at stage 2, where the owners of the rms
choose their organizational structure and determine the incentive scheme of
their managers. To study the stability of these collusive agreements in front
of a fringe of non-colluding rms (the foreigners), I assume the following:
Assumption 3: Foreign owners always delegate to managers.
The assumption above implies that only domestic owners have the option
to collude by not delegating output choices to managers. The stability of the
collusive agreement is assessed considering Friedmans grim trigger strategy
(Friedman, 1971) in which players collude as long as all the others do so.
After detecting a deviation by any of the participants to the cartel, all the
cartel members revert to the non-cooperative equilibrium strategy (i.e. they
set a positive ) forever. Let  2 [0; 1] be the intertemporal discount factor
of the owner of a rm and adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 4. i =  for all owners of domestic rms.
As the attention is focused only on the stability of the cartel between
domestic owners, no specic assumption on the intertemporal discount factor
of foreign owners and of domestic/foreign managers is needed1.
3 Output choices
To solve the model, I proceed by backward induction considering the output
choices that managers face at stage three, once the owners of the rms have
chosen the amount of delegation   0 (where  = 0 is the limit case in
which the manager is a pure prot-seeker or, equivalently, the owner hires no
manager). Rewrite the objective function (3) of a manager with delegation
k; for all k; j 2 f1; :::; ng; as follows:
Mk = (a  c  k   j 6=kqj   qk)qk: (5)
1Equivalently, we could assume that their discount factors are high enough to ensure
that collusion is unstable; see Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) for a complete analysis
of cartel stability where both owners and managers collude.
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The rst-order condition that rm ks manager considers in the market
subgame is
@Mk
@qk
= a  c  k   j 6=kqj   2qk = 0 (6)
Solving for all managers yields the optimal quantity produced by each rm
as a function of the delegation parameters chosen by the owners, the market
structure and the production costs (Sklivas (1987))2:
qk =
a  c+ nk   j 6=kj
n+ 1
: (7)
The optimal output level of rm k is increasing in the amount of delegation
chosen by its owner and decreasing in the delegation choices of the other
rms. This implies the familiar result that, everything else equal, a man-
agerial rm expands her output more than a prot-seeking rm (Vickers,
1985). Substituting and rearranging, total output and the prot accruing
to each rm k can be written as follows, respectively:
Q =
n(a  c) + nk=1k
1 + n
(8)
k =
(a  c  k   j 6=kj)(a  c+ nk   j 6=kj)
(n+ 1)2
: (9)
The optimal amount of delegation of each manager k depends on the delega-
tion choices of the owners of the remaining rms. As the delegation choices
depend on whether the domestic social planner has allowed any domestic
rm to enter the market (stage 1) and on the stability of the cartel between
the domestic owners (at stage 2), four di¤erent outcomes can occur:
(i) no foreign rm is allowed to enter the market (m = 0) and the
domestic owners set the incentive schemes non-cooperatively,
(ii) no foreign rm is allowed to enter the market (m = 0) and domestics
owners collude,
(iii) m  1 foreign rms enter the market and the domestics owners
play non-cooperatively,
(iv) m  1 foreign rms enter the market and the domestics owners
collude.
2At this stage we do not need to specify whether the rm is managerial or prot-
seeking, and the reaction functions of rm ks manager can be obtained without requiring
symmetry.
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For further reference, I will refer to the rst outcome as the (D) equilib-
rium with no entry (where D stands for delegation), which corresponds to
the solution of the delegation game by Vickers (1985) where all rms adopt
symmetric managerial incentives and behave aggressively by expanding their
output beyond the Cournot Nash quantities. In case (ii), the owners opti-
mally collude by not hiring managers, which implies that the delegation
game reduces to a standard Cournot oligopoly with n identical rms. I will
refer to the associated equilibrium as to the (C) outcome. In cases (iii) and
(iv), the domestic planner has allowed a fringe of managerial rms to enter
the market. In case (iii) all domestic and foreign owners delegate; I will refer
to it as the (D) outcome with entry. It is worth stressing that, given the
symmetry between incumbents and entrants, the optimal amount of delega-
tion, the individual production levels and prots are the same as those of
case (i). The only di¤erences between case (i) and case (iii) concerns the
level of domestic social welfare, that in case (iii) is clearly reduced by the
prots accruing to the non-domestic rms. In case (iv) the domestic owners
collude (by not hiring managers) and the foreigners constitute a fringe of
managerial rms. As this case corresponds to a Stackelberg outcome, I will
refer to it as the (S) outcome.
4 Delegation choices
In this Section, I consider the second stage of the game. I separately con-
sider the four possible outcomes that can occur and determine the optimal
incentive schemes, the corresponding output levels and individual prots.
When collusion is protable, I compute the critical value of the discount
factor (which, in case of entry, also depends on the number of entrants)
above which collusion is a stable outcome.
First, consider the cases where only domestic incumbents operate in the
market. When m = 0; two possible equilibria can occur, depending on the
intertemporal discount factor of the domestic owners, where either all of
them delegate to managers or collude by not delegating.
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4.1 (D) outcome, m = 0.
When all domestic owners i; j 2 f1; :::; ng delegate to managers, the optimal
amount of delegation is found solving the rst-order condition @i=@i = 0;
which yields (Vickers, 1985):
i =
(n  1)(a  c  j 6=ij)
2n
(10)
By imposing symmetry, the following optimal amount of delegation :
Di = (a  c)
(n  1)
n2 + 1
> 0: (11)
Substituting Di in the expressions (7)-(9), I get the following output levels
and individual prots:
qDi = (a  c)
n
n2 + 1
(12)
QD = (a  c) n
2
n2 + 1
(13)
Di = (a  c)2
n
(1 + n2)2
(14)
4.2 (C) outcome, m = 0.
In case all domestic owners collude, they choose the delegation prole f1; :::; ng
that maximizes the following joint prot function:
 = ni=1i
=
1
(n+ 1)2
(a  c  ni=1i)[n(a  c) + ni=1i] (15)
subject to the non-negativity condition on i: Taking the derivative with
respect to each i yields:
@
@i
=   1
(n+ 1)2
[(n  1)(a  c) + 2i + 2i6=ji] (16)
As   0; the partial derivative computed above is strictly negative, which
implies that the optimal (corner) solution is i = 0 for all domestic own-
ers3. In other words, when the domestic owners collude to maximize joint
3 If  were unrestricted, the joint prot function (that is strictly concave because it is
the sum of strictly concave functions) would be maximized when the following condition
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prots, the optimal choice is to hire no manager and behave as pure prot-
maximizers. When this is the case, the following output levels and individual
prots result:
qCi = (a  c)
1
n+ 1
(17)
QC = (a  c) n
n+ 1
(18)
Ci = (a  c)2
1
(1 + n)2
: (19)
Note that, compared with the (D) outcome, the Cournot Nash outcome is
associated to a lower output. This implies higher individual prots but a
lower level of consumer surplus, with the consequence that the level of social
welfare associated to the (C) outcome is lower than the one associated with
the (D) outcome with no entry.
To assess the conditions that make case (C) stable, I need to determine
the deviation prots accruing to a domestic owner that does not set  = 0,
while all the others do. Maximizing the prot function (9) with respect to
k the following reaction function obtains (Vickers, 1985):
k =
(n  1)(a  c  j 6=kj)
2n
for k; j 2 f1; :::; ng (20)
If j = 0 for all j 6= k, the optimal deviation requires (Vickers, 1985):
d(0) =
(a  c)(n  1)
2n
(21)
where the zero in brackets signals this is the case of no entry and the pedix
dstands for defection. The corresponding deviation prot is
d(0) =
(a  c)2
4n
> C : (22)
By considering trigger strategies, collusion between domestic owners is stable
if
 > (n; 0) =
d(0)  C
d(0)  D =
 
1 + n2
2
(1 + n)4
(23)
holds: ni=1i =   (n 1)(a c)2 < 0: If the owners adopt symmetric incentive schemes, the
optimal solution is i =   (n 1)(a c)2n that, for the case n = 2 simplies to i =   (a c)4
(see Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002).
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(see Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002), where C and D are, respectively,
the prots accruing to the owner of the domestic rm in the collusive and
in the delegating equilibrium with no entry. The zero appearing in brackets
signals this is the case where m = 0:
4.3 (D) outcome, m  1
Now consider the case where m 2 f1; :::; ng managerial foreign rms have
entered the market. As entrants and incumbents face the same technology
and the good is homogeneous, the only di¤erence between them is that
the incumbents have the option to collude. Clearly, when they all delegate
this di¤erence is lost and the same s, output levels, individual prots
and consumer surplus as in the (D) case with no entry . All equilibrium
outcomes only depend on xed parameters such as the reservation price, the
unit cost of production and the total number of rms in the market. Hence,
the number of entrants m is relevant only to compute the level of domestic
social welfare.
4.4 (S) outcome, m  1
Consider now the case in which the domestic planner has allowed m 2
f1; :::; ng managerial rms to buym incumbents and the remaining n m in-
cumbents collude by choosing the prole of delegation that maximizes joint
prots. Before proceeding note that the (S) outcome requires m to lie in the
interval [1; n  2]; with n  3: The lower bound is necessary because we are
in the case in which entry occurs, the upper bound because the domestic
rms must be at least two to collude.
I proceed by rst assessing the maximum number of entrants that makes
collusion between domestic owners protable; then I determine the condi-
tions for cartel stability. With reference to trigger strategies, stability can
be assessed in terms of the critical value of the intertemporal discount fac-
tor that makes collusion stable. Equivalently, the same condition can be
expressed as a function of the dimension of the fringe. The advantage of
the latter condition is that, given n and , it informs about the critical di-
mension of the fringe that makes the cartel between domestic incumbents
unstable. This implies that the domestic social planner can inuence the
equilibrium outcome by appropriately choosing the dimension of the fringe.
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For expositional convenience, let the entrants be indicated by e; f 2
f1; :::;mg and the incumbents by i 2 fm+ 1; :::; ng: Consider rst the dele-
gation choices made by the foreign owners. They choose non-cooperatively
the optimal amount of delegation that maximizes the objective function in
(9), that can be written as follows:
e =
(a  c  e   f 6=ef   ni=m+1i)(a  c+ ne   f 6=ef   ni=m+1i)
(n+ 1)2
:
(24)
The associated rst-order condition is:
@e
@e
=
1
(n+ 1)2
[(n 1)(a c) 2ne+(n 1)f 6=ef+(n 1)ni=m+1i]: (25)
Now consider the domestic owners. They choose the prole fm+1; :::; ng
that maximizes the following joint prot function:
 = n mi=1 i
=
1
(n+ 1)2
(a  c  ni=m+1i   me=1e)  (26)
[(n m)(a  c) + (m+ 1)ni=m+1i   (n m)me=1e]
To nd the optimal solution, rewrite equation (26) as
 =
1
(n+ 1)2
(a  c  m+1   ni=m+2i   me=1e)  (27)
[(n m)(a  c) + (m+ 1)m+1 + (m+ 1)ni=m+2i   (n m)me=1e]
where m+1 is the amount of delegation chosen by one of the domestic own-
ers. The partial derivative of the joint prot function with respect to m+1
yields:
@
@m+1
=
1
(n+ 1)2
[(1 + 2m  n)(a  c)  2(1 +m)(m+1 +ni=m+2i) +
 (1 + 2m  n)me=1e] (28)
I now assume that the domestic owners adopt a symmetric solution, so that
m+1 = ::: = n = 
S
i , where apex S stands for Stackelberg outcome. Note
also that, as all foreign owners are identical, in equilibrium they adopt a
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symmetric solution e = f = Se for all e; f 2 f1; :::;mg: This allows to
simplify the rst-order conditions (25) and (28) as follows
@e
@e
=
1
(n+ 1)2
[(n  1)(a  c) + (29)
 (nm+ n m+ 1)Se   (n2   nm  n+m)Si ]
@
@i
=
1
(n+ 1)2
[(a  c)(1 + 2m  n) + (30)
 2(n m)(1 +m)Si  m(1 + 2m  n)Se ]:
When m < n 12 , the partial derivative of the joint prot function (30) is
negative and, as in the case of collusion with no entry considered in the pre-
vious section, the non-negativity restriction implies that the optimal choice
of the n   m domestic owners is to set Si = 0 for all i 2 f1; :::; n   mg4.
Accordingly, the m foreign owners choose the optimal amount of delegation
that solves the following condition
@e
@e
=
1
(n+ 1)2
[(n  1)(a  c)  2nSe + (n  1)e6=fSf ] = 0 (31)
where e; f 2 f1; :::;mg. Exploiting symmetry, the optimal amount of dele-
gation for the foreign entrants is:
Se = (a  c)
n  1
n m+ nm+ 1 (32)
Substituting Se in the reaction function of the managers (7) and rearranging
I obtain the output levels of the domestic entrants and the foreign incum-
bents, respectively:
qSe (m) = (a  c)
n
n m+ nm+ 1 (33)
qSi (m) = (a  c)
1
n m+ nm+ 1 (34)
where m signals that these outcomes depend on the number of entrants.
4The Appendix contains the computations showing that, with m  (n 1)=2, collusion
between incumbents is never protable.
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The associated total output levels and individual prots are, respectively,
QS(m) = (a  c) nm+ n m
n+ nm m+ 1 (35)
Se (m) = (a  c)2
n
(n m+ nm+ 1)2 (36)
Si (m) = (a  c)2
1
(n m+ nm+ 1)2 (37)
Comparing Si (m) with 
D
i to check when collusion between incumbents is
protable yields:
Si (m) Di = (a c)2
(n  1)(n3   n2m2   2n2m+m2n  2mn  1)
(1 + n2)2(n m+ nm+ 1)2 : (38)
This expression is positive whenm 2 (m1;m2), wherem1;2 =  n
2 n(1+n2)pn
n(n 1) :
I disregard the negative solution and note that m2 =
 n2 n+(1+n2)pn
n(n 1)  1 if
n > 3:38.
Proposition 1 In case of entry, collusion between the domestic owners is
protable if n  4 and m 2 [1;m2].
When the market is very concentrated, if there is at least on managerial
rm in the market it is never protable to be pure prot-seekers. This occurs
because the prots accruing to the prot-seeking rms are lower than those
associated to a (D) outcome, in which all rms are managerial.
Remark 2 If n = 3 and m = 1, collusion between domestic owners is never
protable.
Proposition 3 When collusion between domestic owners is protable af-
ter entry, the entrants optimally set Se = (a   c) n 1n m+nm+1 ; for all e 2
f1; :::;mg; and the incumbents set Si = 0 for all i 2 fm+ 1; :::; ng.
After determining when the cartel is protable, I want to assess the
stability of the cartel between domestic owners. When all foreign owners set
the amount of delegation according to (32) and all but one domestic owners
set Si = 0; the optimal delegation of the domestic owner that deviates from
the cartel is:
d(m) = (a  c) n
2   1
2n(n m+ nm+ 1) (39)
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Figure 1: Critical value of the discount rate above which collusion between
national owners is stable. The curves correspond, from bottom to top, to
m = 0;m = 1 and m = 2.
which entails the following deviation prot:
d(m) = (a  c)2 (1 + n
2)
4n(n m+ nm+ 1)2 > 
S
i (m): (40)
By considering trigger strategies, collusion between domestic owners is stable
if
 > (n;m) =
d(m)  Si (m)
d(m)  D ; (41)
where the critical value of the discount function is given by the following
expression:
(n;m) =
(n  1)(1 + n2)2
(n2   1  2nm)(n3 + 2n2m  2nm+ 3n2 + 3n+ 1) (42)
Proposition 4 If n  4 and m 2 [1;m2), collusion between domestic own-
ers is stable if  > (n;m).
In Fig.1 the curves (n; 0), (n; 1) and (n; 2) are drawn to illustrate
how the stability of the (S) outcome depends on  and n: For  < (n; 0)
the (D) outcome always obtains, even when there is no entrant, because the
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domestic owners are too impatient to collude successfully. Between (n; 0)
and (n; 1), the (C) outcome obtains if there is no entry, and the (D)
outcome obtains when there is at least one entrant. Between the curves
(n; 1) and (n; 2); the (C) outcome emerges before entry (because  >
(n; 0)), and the (S) outcome is stable if there is one entrant, but unstable
if there are two entrants (because (n; ) is such that (n; 1) <  < (n; 2)):
For m  1; (n;m) is non monotone in n : it is decreasing for low values
of n and it is increasing when n is large (see also Lambertini and Trombetta,
2002). Intuitively a stable cartel needs high discount rates when the total
number of rms is low because d(m) Si (m), the incentive to deviate from
the cartel, is high. As n increases, the gains from deviation decrease, while
d(m) D; the di¤erence between the one-period prot from deviation and
the punishment prot, grows rapidly. This makes collusion more and more
appealing, and lower discount rates are required. If n increases further, all
prots decrease, but the gains from collusion decrease more rapidly than the
punishment prots D corresponding to the non-cooperative solution. This
makes the cartel more unstable, and higher discount rates are required to
sustain collusion.
With reference to condition (41), stability can also be assessed in terms
of the critical number of rms that makes collusion between foreign owners
stable. Let m(n; ) be such a number, which is dened as
m(n; ) =Maxf 2n(n+ 1) + (1 + n
2)
p
[(n2 + 1)  (n2   1)]
2(n  1)n ; 1g < m2:
(43)
In Fig. 2 the critical dimension of the fringe of managerial rms that makes
the cartel between domestic owners unstable is drawn for n  4: The hor-
izontal line corresponds to m = 1: For increasing values of , the m locus
shifts upward, implying that, ceteris paribus, a larger fringe is needed to
make the cartel unstable. Note that m  1 if   (n; 1); which means
that one entrant can make the (S) outcome stable if the domestic owners
are patient enough, given the total number of rms, to sustain collusion.
Proposition 5 For n  4 :
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Figure 2: Plot of the critical dimension of m(n; ), the fringe ensuring
stability to the cartel between national owners. Given (n; ), the cartel is
unstable if m > m(n; ) and stable otherwise.
 there exists a unique critical dimension of the fringe m(n; ) such
that, after entry of foreign managerial rms, collusion between owners
is unstable if m > m(n; )
 if  > (n; 1), then m(n; ) > 1 is a non-monotone, strictly concave
function of n
 if  < (n; 1) or, equivalently, m(n; ) < 1; one entrant is enough to
make the (S) outcome unstable
5 Optimal number of entrants.
Considering the welfare function of a domestic social planner, I now deter-
mine the number of entrants that maximizes the level of domestic welfare
associated with the (D) outcome with m  1 entrants and the (S) outcome
with m  1 entrants. Using the the results of the previous section, the levels
of domestic social welfare are, respectively:
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NSWD(m) = (a  c)2 n
 
n3 + 2n  2m
2 (n2 + 1)2
(44)
if m 2 [minfm(n; ); 1g; n]
NSWS(m) =
(a  c)2
(n+ nm m+ 1)2 [n m+
1
2
(n+mn m)2] (45)
if n  4 and m 2 [1;m(n; ))
Remark 6 NSWD(m) is decreasing in m; NSWS(m) is increasing in m:
The level of NSW associated to the (D) equilibrium is decreasing in
the number of entrants because the output does not depend on the number
of entrants, but total prots do so. On the other hand, the level of social
welfare associated to the (S) outcome increases with m because the gains on
consumer surplus (due to the aggressive output choices of the m managerial
rms) more than compensate for the losses in the domestic prots. Given
the previous remark, the optimal choice of the domestic planner would be
to choose m; given n and , in both cases. Yet, there exists an implicit con-
straint, in that m must be an integer number. Let ms = floor(m(n; ))be
the integer part ofm(n; ) andmD = ceiling(m(n; ))5. For each outcome,
the optimal number of rms is as follows:
Proposition 7 When collusion after entry is not stable and the (D) out-
come obtains, domestic social welfare is maximum if m = mD
Proposition 8 When collusion after entry is stable and the (S) outcome
obtains, domestic social welfare is maximum if m = mS :
6 Equilibrium selection
The levels of NSW for the (D) equilibrium with no entry, the (C) equi-
librium with no entry, the (D) equilibrium with mD entrants and the (S)
equilibrium with mS entrants are, respectively:
5The oor and the ceiling functions are two functions which convert arbitrary real
numbers to close integers. The oor function of a real number x is a function that returns
the highest integer less than or equal to x. Formally, for all real numbers x, floor(x) =
maxfn 2 Zjn  xg. The ceiling function is the function that returns the smallest integer
not less than x, or, formally, ceiling(x) = minfn 2 Zjx  ng:
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NSWD(0) = (a  c)2 n
2
 
n2 + 2

2 (n2 + 1)2
(46)
NSWC = (a  c)2 n (n+ 2)
2 (n+ 1)2
(47)
NSWD(mD) = (a  c)2
n
 
n3 + 2n  2mD

2 (n2 + 1)2
(48)
NSWS(mS) = (a  c)2
[n m+ 12(n+ nmS  mS)2]
(n+ nmS  mS + 1)2 (49)
It is easy to check that the (D) outcome with no entry is associated
to the highest level of domestic welfare where all rms are domestics and
managerial. This outcome corresponds to the more competitive of the four
cases, and it occurs when  < . The (S) outcome with mS entrants yields
the lowest domestic welfare and is not desirable. The social planner will try
to avoid it either by not allowing any foreign rm to enter the market or by
allowing mD foreign rms to enter and make the (S) outcome unstable. In
the former case, a (D) outcome with no entry or a (C) outcome obtains, while
in the latter a (D) outcome with mD entrants obtains. As the (D) outcome
with no entry is the most desirable outcome, no policy intervention is needed
when  < . On the contrary, when  >  it is optimal for the domestic
planner to allow mD entrants in the market if NSWD(mD) > NSWC :
Proposition 9 No foreign rm should be allowed to enter the market:
 if  < (n; 0);
 if n 2 f2; 3g;
 if  > (n; 1) and NSWC > NSWD(mD):
Proposition 10 It is optimal to allow mD foreign rms to enter the market
 if  2 (; (n; 1)) and n > 3
 if  > (n; 1) and NSWC < NSWD(mD):
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The propositions determine the conditions that should drive the de-
cision of the domestic planner. To understand the logic, observe that if
 < (n; 0); the (D) outcome with no entrants obtains. This is the equi-
librium with the highest domestic welfare level, and thus no intervention is
needed. If  > (n; 0); we must distinguish di¤erent cases by comparing
NSWC (which occurs when m = 0 and  > ) and NSWD(mD) (which
occurs when m = mD  1):
Case (a): n 2 f2; 3g: In this case the (C) outcome obtains before entry
and the (D) outcome with m 2 f1; 2; 3g entrants. As NSWC > NSWD(m)
if n < 3:28, no intervention is needed.
Case (b): n > 3 and  2 (; (n; 1)): In this case, before entry the (C)
outcome obtains and, in case mD = 1, the (D) outcome with one entrant ob-
tains. It is optimal to allow one managerial rm to enter the market because
NSWC < NSWD(1) for all n : entry is desirable because it improves the
economy by inducing a (D) equilibrium that is better than the (C) outcome
Case (c):  > (n; 1): As for the previous case, the (C) outcome results
before entry and the (D) outcome with mD  2 entrants results after entry.
With respect to the previous case, note that mD changes as a function of n
and  and the levels of domestic welfare must be explicitly computed and
compared. To illustrate this point, in Fig. 3 I set  = :85 and I plot both m
and mD as functions of n: The jumps occur at n = 3:88 (where mD becomes
2) and at n = 20:13 (where mD comes back to one). In Fig. 4 I plot
both NSWD(mD) and NSWC to show graphically the relative rankings as
functions of n. Now consider a market where n = 4: We are in case (c)
because  = :85 > (n; 1) = :83: With this conguration, m(n; ) = 1:02
and mD = 2. The comparison between the two associated levels of domestic
welfare yields NSWC = :48 > NSWD(2) = :47; and it is optimal to let
no entrant in. If instead n = 6, mD would still be 2, but we would get
the opposite ranking as NSWC = :489 < NSWD(2) = :49: In this case,
the (C) outcome is better than the (D) outcome with mD entrants and no
intervention is needed.
7 Conclusion
The separation between ownership and control of market decisions signif-
icantly a¤ects the competitive behavior of an oligopolist. In a Cournot
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Figure 3: Plot of m(n; d) and mD as functions of n:
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Figure 4: Comparison of the levels of national welfare for the (C) outcome
(smooth curve) and the (D) outcome with mD entrants (broken curve) when
 = :85:
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oligopoly, when the incentive schemes of the managers are a mix of prots
and sales, managers optimally behave aggressively by expanding their out-
put. As this outcome is dominated by the Cournot Nash equilibrium, the
owners of the rms might collude to reduce competition. I have omvesti-
gated how a cartel between owners is a¤ected by the existence of a fringe of
rms that always delegate output choices to managers. Adopting the Vickers
(1985) framework, I have shown that it is always possible to make unstable
the cartel between owners by appropriately selecting the dimension of the
fringe, and that the dimension of the fringe that ensures cartel stability is
non-monotone in the total number of rms operating in the market.
The introduction of a fringe of managerial rms can be used by a planner
in order to modify the equilibrium outcome. For example, a domestic plan-
ner might contemplate whether to allow foreign managerial rms to enter
a domestic market where the owners of rms collude by adopting organiza-
tional structures that reduce competition.
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8 Appendix
To show that collusion between incumbents is not protable when m > n 12 ,
consider prot functions (29) and (30). If m > n 12 ; the optimal amount of
delegation of domestic and foreign managers is as follows:
^e = (a  c) n  1
2 +m+ nm
^i = (a  c) 1 + 2m  n
(2 +m+ nm)(n m) :
Note that all owners always choose a positive amount of delegation. Sub-
stituting ^e and ^i in the managers reaction functions (7) and rearranging,
I obtain the output levels of, respectively, the domestic entrants and the
foreign incumbents:
q^e(m) = (a  c) n
2 +m+ nm
q^i(m) = (a  c) 1 +m
(n m)(2 +m+ nm)
where m in brackets signals that these outcomes depend on the number
of entrants. The associated total output levels and individual prots are,
respectively:
Q^(m) = (a  c)(1 +m+mn)
2 +m+ nm
^e(m) = (a  c)2 n
(1 + nm m+ n)2
^i(m) = (a  c)2 1
(1 + nm m+ n)2
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We are now ready to check whether collusion between domestic owners is
protable. Comparing ^i(m) and Di yields:
^i(m) Di =  (a c)2
(1 + n)(n m  1)(1 + 3nm+m2n  n2  mn2 +m2n)
(n m)(2 +m+ nm)2(1 + n2)2 :
As all the terms in brackets are positive, the cartel is never protable.
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